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VI 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20000298-CA 
v. : 
BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from convictions for forgery, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999), and theft by deception, a third degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should the Court consider a claim of error where defendant's trial counsel 
affirmatively led the trial court to believe the challenged instructions were satisfactory? 
'"[A] party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led 
the trial court into committing the error.'" State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App. 309, ^54, 989 
P.2dl091. 
If this Court considers the merits of defendant's claim, where the jury instructions 
as a whole instructed that the State must prove the essential allegations of theft beyond a 
reasonable doubt, did the trial court commit plain error by not sua sponte referring to the 
State's burden again in the accomplice liability instruction? 
In the absence of any objection to the trial court's instructions, error may be assigned 
only in order to avoid manifest injustice. State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,445 (Utah 1996); 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 178 (Utah App. 1992). In reviewing a claim of manifest 
injustice, the appellate court uses the "same standard"as when determining the presence of 
plain error. Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 445. Thus, to constitute manifest injustice, "it should 
have been obvious to the trial court that it was committing error." Id. 
2. Is the jury verdict for forgery and theft by deception supportable? 
An appellate court will not reverse on grounds of insufficient evidence "[w]here there 
is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which 
findings of all elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt[.]" State v. 
Goddard, 871 P.2d 540,543 (Utah 1994). See State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8 U 40-42,994 P.2d 
177 (same). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
The following determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are 
attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (1999); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Brian William Drake, was charged with forgery (Count I) and theft by 
deception (Count II) (R. 6-7). A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 122-23). The trial 
court sentenced defendant to statutory zero-to-five-year terms to be served consecutively in 
the Utah State Prison, but suspended the prison terms and placed defendant on probation (R. 
132-33). Defendant timely appealed (R. 135). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
Catherine Tousley testified that on April 28, 1998, defendant, who was a friend of 
hers, asked her to run a check, drawn on Providian National Bank in Tilton, New Hampshire 
("Providian"), through her checking account at America First Credit Union ("America First") 
(R. 150:64-67, 69; State's Ex. 1). The check was made out for $3,000 to "Patricia 
Westlake," at "149 South Seventh East" in Salt Lake City, where defendant lived at the time 
of the offenses (R. 150:69-70).2 Defendant told Ms. Tousley that he did not have an account 
in Utah and that Ms. Westlake owed him money (R. 150:68-70). Ms. Tousley testified that 
she did not know Ms. Westlake, nor had Ms. Tousley ever lived at 149 South 700 East or 
ever gotten into a mailbox or picked up any mail at that address (R. 150:68, 70). 
Defendant instructed Ms. Tousley that in exchange for her running the check through 
1
 The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Wright, 893 P.2d 1113, 1115 (Utah App. 1995). 
2
 The parties stipulated that defendant lived at that 149 South 700 East from April 
28, 1998 though May 1, 1998 (R. 150:112-13). 
3 
her account and delivering $2,500 of the $3,000 to him, she would get $500 (R. 150:70). 
When defendant gave her the check it was already endorsed, "Payed [sic] to the order o f and 
signed, "Partricia [sic] R. Westlake" (R. 150:70-71; State's Ex. 1). Although she thought "at 
the back of her head" that there was something wrong about the transaction, she endorsed the 
check, "Cathi Tousley," and deposited it into the ATM at an America First branch (R. 
150:70-71,79). 
The following day, April 29, she withdrew $2,500 from a different America First 
branch and gave it to defendant (R. 72). Later that day, defendant gave her another $3,000 
check made to and signed by "Patricia Westlake," and instructed Ms. Tousley to do the same 
thing with it as she had with the first check (R. 150:72-73; State's Ex. 2).3 Defendant again 
said that Ms. Westlake owed him money (R. 150:73-74). Following defendant's instructions, 
Ms. Tousley endorsed the back of the check with her name and deposited it into yet a third 
America First branch, in West Valley City (R. 73-74).4 
On or about May 1, Ms. Tousley checked with the West Valley City branch and 
learned that the second $3,000 check had not been credited to her account (R. 150:74). Later 
that day, defendant came to Ms. Tousley's home to inquire about the second check (R. 
150:74). When she told him it had not cleared, defendant was angry and threatened to hurt 
3
 The two checks are attached at Addendum B. 
4
 The information and the prosecutor's notice to the jury make clear that defendant 
was not charged in connection with his conduct relating to the second check (R. 6-7; R. 
150:131). 
4 
her (R. 150:75). Afterward, they went together to the West Valley City branch, but it had 
closed (R. 150:75). 
Defendant's and Ms. Tousley5s check dealings came to light when Ms. Trina Culley, 
the lead teller at the West Valley City branch of America First opened the envelope 
containing the second $3,000 check. She thought it unusual that a cash advance check as 
large as $3,000 was endorsed by two individuals (R. 150:92-94; State's Ex. 2). Verifying 
that Patricia Westlake had an account with America First, she compared the "Patricia 
Westlake" signature on the check with filmed documents of Ms. Westlake's signature and 
determined that they did not match (R. 150:94-95). Ms. Culley placed a "hold" on the check 
and mailed it to Ms. Westlake (R. 150:95). 
Caroline Twitchell, director of security at America First, called Ms. Tousley to 
investigate the false check. Ms. Tousley told her that she had lent her ATM card and her PIN 
to some friends, but had no idea what had happened after that (R. 150:98,104-05). However, 
Ms. Tousley did acknowledge having withdrawn $2,500 one day after depositing the first 
check (R. 150:105-06; Defendant's Ex. 7). 
Sometime after April 28,1998, Patricia Westlake received a telephone call from Ms. 
Culley (R. 150:110). Ms. Westlake formerly had an account with Providian, which she 
closed prior to April 28, 1998 (R. 150:108-09). However, the bank continued to send her 
$3,000 checks as an inducement to reopen her account, even though she "absolutely" did not 
want the account (R. 150:109). During her conversation with Ms. Culley, Ms. Westlake 
5 
learned that Providian had continued to send the $3,000 checks to her 149 South 700 East 
address (R. 150:110). 
Ms. Westlake lived at 149 South 700 East for seven years prior to her moving out in 
August, 1997 (R. 150:107). The residence at that address had been divided into two separate 
apartments, one upstairs and the other downstairs (R. 150:107-08). She lived in the 
downstairs apartment. The resident above her did not have a key to her apartment (R. 
150:108). Only she had access to the mail, which was delivered through a mail slot in the 
front door onto the floor of her hallway (R. 150:108). 
Examining the first check for $3,000, State's Exhibit 1, made out on seven months 
after she had left her old address, Ms. Westlake testified that the "Patricia Westlake" 
signature on the back of the check was not hers (R. 150:110-11). Ms. Westlake also 
confirmed that the signature on the back of the second $3,000 check, State's Exhibit 2, was 
not hers (R. 150:111). She further testified that she did not know defendant, did not owe him 
$6,000, and never gave him permission to sign her name to the two checks (R. 150:111 -12). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant invited any error in the elements instructions by affirmatively approving 
them on three occasions, and therefore, this Court should not consider his claim of error 
under the manifest injustice exception to the waiver rule. In any case, defendant has failed 
to show obvious error in the instructions because, taken as a whole, they fully and adequately 
6 
informed the jury of the elements required to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt 
of the charged offenses. Even if there was error in the charge to the jury, defendant was not 
prejudiced because counsel for both the State and defendant informed the jury that 
defendant's party liability was essential to the case and evidence of defendant's guilt was 
uncontroverted. 
POINT II 
The evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of forgery and theft by deception. 
Particularly, the evidence showed that defendant, through his residency and the manner in 
which the mail of the checks' payee was delivered, had exclusive access to forged checks and 
iirected an accomplice to utter the checks and return the proceeds to him. Any 
inconsistencies in the testimony of the State's principal witness were either trivial or 
anderstandable attempts to minimize her culpability, a circumstance which the jury obviously 
:onsidered in weighing the credibility of her testimony. 
7 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIM UNDER THE MANIFEST INJUSTICE EXCEPTION 
BECAUSE HE INVITED THE CLAIMED ERROR; IN ANY EVENT, 
BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE WERE ADEQUATE 
TO INFORM THE JURY THAT THE STATE MUST PROVE ALL THE 
ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE CHARGED OFFENSES 
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW 
PLAIN ERROR IN THE JURY CHARGE ON PARTY LIABILITY 
Defendant claims the trial court failed to instruct the jury that to convict him of 
forgery and theft by deception it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted as Ms. 
Tousley's accomplice, an essential element of both offenses. Aplt. Br. at 14-19. By omitting 
aiding and abetting from the elements instructions, defendant argues, his fundamental rights 
to a trial were violated, an error entitled to review under the manifest injustice standard. 
Aplt. Br. at 19-22. Finally, defendant contends that giving an erroneous elements instruction 
is not amenable to harmless error review, and even if it is defendant's conviction as an 
accomplice cannot be upheld on Ms. Tousley's unreliable and incredible testimony. Aplt. 
Br. at 23-28. 
Defendant's argument fails at every juncture. First, defendant is not entitled to 
review under the manifest injustice standard because trial counsel invited the purported error. 
Second, the elements instructions, read as a whole, fully and understandably directed the jury 
to consider the all elements necessary to find defendant guilty of the offenses as an 
accomplice. Finally, both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have applied harmless 
8 
error analysis to claimed errors in an elements instruction, which if applied in this case fully 
supports the outcome. 
A. Factual background. 
At the close of evidence the trial court read the instructions to jury (R. 86-121; 
150:123). Those instructions directed the jury "to consider the instructions as a whole" 
(Instruction # 15 at R. 99). They also included an instruction on party ("accomplice") liability 
couched in the statutory terms and an elements instruction for each charged offenses which 
required that the jury find defendant guilty only if it found beyond a reasonable doubt the 
required elements for each offense "as charged in counts [I and II]" (Instruction #19,21,25 
at R. 103, 103, 110). Further, the information instruction set out the statutory elements of 
forgery (Count I) and theft by deception (Count II), each charging defendant as "a party to 
the offense" (Instruction #1 at R. 86).5 
After reading the instructions to the jury, the trial court asked both the prosecutor and 
defense counsel if they waived any objections to the jury instructions (R. 150:123). The 
record at that point only reflects the prosecutor's negative response, but the trial court's 
acknowledgment of the prosecutor's response and the flow of proceedings, without any 
apparent objection by defense counsel, plainly suggests that defense counsel silently signaled 
his waiver of any objection to the instructions (R. 150:123). However, at the end of closing 
argument, the trial court noted that the parties had an earlier, off-the-record discussion 
5
 All relevant instructions are attached at Addendum C. 
9 
concerning the instruction and stated its understanding that both parties had stipulated to the 
instructions without objection (R. 150:157-58). When the trial court asked for a confirmation 
of its understanding and offered the parties an opportunity to object, defense counsel 
responded, "There is no objection" (R. 150:158). 
B. Defendant is not entitled to review of his claim under the manifest injustice 
standard because not only does he fail to satisfy the requirements of the 
manifest injustice standard, but he also invited the error asserted on appeal. 
Although his trial counsel did not object at trial, defendant now argues that because 
the trial court failed to instruct the jury on accomplice liability as a necessary element to 
finding him guilty of the charged offenses, his convictions were manifestly unjust and must 
therefore be reversed. Aplt. Br. at 20-21. The claim lacks legal merit. 
Because defendant failed to object to the instructions in the trial court (R. 123, 157-
58), he has waived his claim unless he show that he is entitled to review to avoid manifest 
injustice. See State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602,608 (Utah App. 1998) ("c[J]ury instructions 
to which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed absent a showing of manifest 
injustice."') (quoting State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App. 1995)). See Utah R. of 
Crim. Proc. 19(c).6 
Defendant correctly asserts that Utah's appellate courts have generally held that "[t]he 
6
 Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: "No party may assign 
as error any portion of the charge or omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before 
the jury is instructed, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of 
his objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice." 
10 
complete absence of an elements instruction on a crime is an error we review to avoid 
manifest injustice." State v. Jones, 823 P.2d 1059,1061 (Utah 1991) (emhasis added).7 It is 
evident from the facts recited above and more particularly argued below, see Aple. Br. at 
Point II, that defendant has failed to show that the accomplice liability element was 
completely omitted from the trial court's instructions. Therefore, the general rule does not 
apply in this case. 
More importantly, defendant invited the error complained of on appeal and is, 
therefore, not entitled to review of the claim under the manifest injustice exception. "'[A] 
party cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court 
into committing the error.'" State v. Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 309, ^ }54, 989 P.2d 1091 
{quoting State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996)). "c[T]he manifest injustice 
exception has no application in cases in which the defendant invited the very error 
complained of on appeal.'" Id. (quoting State v. Kiriluk, 975 P.2d 469, 475 (Utah 
App. 1999)). 
In Perdue, this Court first found that a defendant waived a challenge to jury 
7
 Defendant also cites four additional cases for the general proposition that 
complete absence in an instruction of a necessary element of an offense is reviewable 
under the manifest injustice standard. Aplt. Br. at 21 (citing State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 
81 (Utah 1983) ("instruction misstates the law of criminal trespass and is entirely 
inconsistent with the statutory definition of that offense); State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33, 35 
(Utah 1980) (omission of required intent to permanently deprive in theft by deception 
charge); American Fork v. Carr, 970 717, 720 (Utah App. 1998) (omission of required 
intent for lewdness); State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352, (Utah App. 1995) (complete omission 
of lack of consent element in forcible sexual abuse conviction)). 
11 
instructions which he himself submitted to the trial court. Perdue, 813 P.2d at 1204-06. This 
Court then declined to review the claim under the manifest injustice standard. The Court first 
acknowledged that the supreme court had reviewed an instructional error under the manifest 
injustice in Lesley, where the challenged instruction was "'entirely inconsistent with the 
statutory definition of [the] offense.'" Id. at 1206. However, this Court refused to conduct 
a similar review where the defendant had invited any error by tendering the challenged 
instruction himself. Id. The Court stated: 
Here, we do not reach an evaluation of the correctness of the submitted 
instruction because if there was error, it was invited by defendant, and where 
invited error butts up against manifest injustice, the invited error rule 
prevails. 
Id. [Emphasis added.] 
In declining to review the instructional challenge, the Perdue court particularly relied 
on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987). In 
that case, the defendant, when asked by the trial court if either party objected to a 
subsequently challenged instruction, responded, "I have no objection. I have read it." Id. 
738 P.2d at 1022. Invoking the invited error rule in spirit, if not in name, the supreme court 
refused to apply the manifest error exception where "counsel consciously chose not to assert 
any objection that might have been raised and affirmatively led the trial court to believe that 
there was nothing wrong with the instruction." Id. at 1023. 
This circumstances here present even a stronger case for declining review of 
defendant's claim under the manifest injustice standard than in Medina. The trial court first 
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read the jury instructions aloud in defendant's presence, thus assuring that counsel heard 
them even if he had not earlier considered them (R. 150:123). Thereafter, the court asked 
for any objections, and although the record does not at that point reflect an express response 
from defense counsel, it is apparent from the flow of events that he signaled his assent (R. 
150:123). However, before the jury retired and at the end of closing arguments, the trial 
court noted that the parties had had an off-the-record discussion concerning the instruction 
and stated its understanding that both parties had stipulated to the instructions without 
objection (R. 150:157-58). When the trial court asked if the parties agreed with its 
understanding and offered them an opportunity to make a record of any objections, defense 
counsel responded, "There is no objection" (R. 150:158). The proceedings clearly show that 
at multiple points defendant assented to the instructions. Because defendant "affirmatively 
led the trial court to believe that there was nothing wrong with the instruction," See Medina, 
738 P.2d at 1023, reassuring the court of his assent on at least three occasions, this court 
should decline to consider defendant's claim under the manifest injustice exception. 
C. The challenged instructions are not obviously incorrect. 
In State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993), this Court outlined the standard of 
review applied to a challenged jury instruction: 
A challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly stating the law presents a 
question of law, which we review for correctness. State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 
1232, 1244 (Utah), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 979 (1993). Jury instructions must 
be read and evaluated as a whole. State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1146 
(Utah 1989). They must accurately and adequately inform a criminal jury as 
to the basic elements of the crime charged. State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235,239 
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(Utah 1985). However, if taken as a whole they fairly instruct the jury on the 
law applicable to the case, the fact that one of the instructions, standing alone, 
is not as accurate as it might have been is not reversible error. State v. Brooks, 
638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 470 (Utah 
App. 1993). 
Id. at 3; see also State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 1994); Cage v. Louisiana, 
111 S. Ct. 328,329 (1990) ("In construing the instruction, we consider how reasonable jurors 
could have understood the charge as a whole."). 
"[J]ury instructions to which a party failed to object at trial will not be reviewed 
absent a showing of manifest injustice." State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 
1998) (quoting State v. Gibson, 908 P.2d 352,354 (Utah App. 1995); Utah R. of Grim. Proc. 
19(c). "[I]n most circumstances, the term 'manifest injustice' is synonymous with the 'plain 
error' standard[.]" State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-122 (Utah 1989). In order to show 
plain error, defendant must show: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant[.]" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 
1208 (Utah 1993). 
Defendant has failed to satisfy any part of the plain error test. In fact, the instructions 
plainly inform the jury of the elements necessary to convict defendant of the charged offenses 
as an accomplice. The jury was instructed "to consider all the instructions as a whole and 
to regard each in the light of all the others" (Instruction #15 at R. 99). The first paragraph 
of Instruction 21, instructing the jury on the elements it must find to convict defendant of 
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forgery states: 
Before you can convict the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, of the 
offense of Forgery as charged in count I of the information, you must find 
from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of 
the following elements of that offense . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
(Instruction #21 at R. 105). Instruction #25, providing for theft by deception, recites the 
same requirements for that offense (Instruction #25 at R. 110). 
The information instruction, reciting the charge for each offense, states: 
You are instructed that the defendant BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the commission of 
FORGERY AND THEFT BY DECEPTION. In Information alleges: 
FORGERY, a Third Degree Felony... , in that the defendant, BRIAN 
WILLIAM DRAKE, a party to the offense, did alter, make, complete, execute, 
authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter any writing so that the writing or 
the making, completion, execution, authentication, issuance, transference, 
publication or utterance purported to be the act of another, with a purpose to 
defraud. [Emphasis added.] 
(Instruction #1 at R. 86). Instruction #1 uses the same language, "a party to the offense," to 
describe theft by deception. 
The trial court also gave the jury a party ("accomplice") liability instruction in the 
language of the operative statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999), verbatim: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, 
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to 
engage in conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as 
a party for such conduct. [Emphasis added.] 
(Instruction #19 at R. 103). 
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Crucially, defendant fails to mention that the trial court also gave the following 
instruction: 
You are instructed that to the Information the defendant has entered 
a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies each of the essential 
allegations of the charges contained in the Information and casts upon 
the State the burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt. [Emphasis added.] 
(Instruction #3 at R. 87). The instructions as a whole, by express statement and incorporation 
by reference to the information, clearly inform the jury of the various elements of defendant's 
offenses as charged which it must find beyond a reasonable doubt to find him guilty. 
This case is distinguishable from Laine, cited by defendant in support of his claim. 
Aplt. Br. at 15, 21. In Laine, the Utah Supreme Court found the charge to the jury on the 
elements of the offense inadequate because, although an information instruction referenced 
the required element of intent, the instructions as a whole did not require the jury to find that 
element beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 618 P.2d at 35. Instruction #3 expressly remedies 
that distinguishing factor in this case. 
Defendant acknowledges that not all elements need appear in a single jury instruction. 
See Aplt. Br. at 15. However, he argues that the foregoing instructions, even read together, 
fail to communicate all the elements at issue in the case. See Aplt. Br. at 15. First, defendant 
claims that neither Instruction 19, nor all the relevant instructions taken together, inform the 
jury that defendant must have acted as Ms. Tousley's accomplice. See Aplt. Br. at 14-17. 
Because defendant has failed to cite any authority that the identity of an accomplice is an 
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element that must be charged in the information or charged to the jury as an element of an 
offense, this Court should decline to consider it. State v. Shepherd, 1999 Utah Ct. App. 503, 
f 27, 989 P.2d 503 ("This court has routinely declined to consider arguments which are not 
adequately briefed on appeal.M) (citation omitted).8 
Defendant further argues that "[n]o reasonable person, untrained in the law, is capable 
of performing such legal gymnastics [as assembling the various instructions in this case into 
a coherent charge to the jury]." Aplt. Br. at 18. Contrary to defendant's claim, Utah's 
appellate courts have repeatedly found dispersed instructions adequately informed the jury 
of the elements of the offense charged. See e.g., State v. Larsen, 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah 
App. 1994) (finding that because "purpose to deprive" and "intent" were equated in four 
8
 Moreover, while Ms. Tousley's name does not appear in the instructions, the jury 
could not possibly have been uninformed that she was defendant's accomplice. The 
instructions repeatedly require the jury to be guided by the evidence in determining the 
facts of defendant's guilt or innocence. See Instruction #7 at R. 91 ("You are the sole and 
final judges of all question of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such 
questions for yourselves from the evidence . . . . " ) ; Instruction #8 at R. 92 ("You are not 
to consider evidence offered but not admitted, . . . . ) ; Instruction #9 at R. 93 ("[Y]ou are 
the final judges and must determine from the evidence what the facts are."); Instruction 
#10 at R. 94 ("The evidence to be considered by you includes the testimony of witnesses, 
exhibits received by the Court, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from facts proven in the case . . . . " ) ; Instruction #11 at R. 95 ("Two classes of 
evidence are recognized and admitted in courts of justice . . . ."); Instruction #16 at R. 100 
("Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt. . . ."); Instruction #21 & 25 at R. 105, 110 ("Before you can convict 
the defendant,. . . , you must find from all the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt.. 
. . If after careful consideration of all the evidence in this case . . . . " ) . The evidence 
points only to Ms. Tousley as a potential accomplice. Thus, this aspect of defendant's 
claim lacks merit. 
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other instructions, including one which directed the jury with the phrase, "as defined in these 
instructions," the instructions as a whole fairly instructed the jury on the law applicable to 
the case). 
Defendant also appears to argue that the trial court failed to adequately define for the 
jury the operative terms of Instruction #19, the party liability instruction. Aplt. Br. at 19. In 
support, defendant cites State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), wherein 
the supreme court reversed a conviction for attempted robbery because the instructions failed 
to define "attempt" using the language of the attempt statute. Id. at 291-92. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-4-101(1), -(2) (1999) ("[A] person is guilty of attempt to commit a crime... if. 
. . he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of the offense 
[which does not occur] unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the 
offense."). Harmon does not apply to this case. 
"Where the term is of common knowledge and usage it is both unnecessary and 
inadvisable to make the instructions more prolix and complicated by the use of synonyms 
which add little or nothing to make a term easier to understand than the term itself." State 
v. Wilcox, 498 P.2d 357, 358 (Utah 1972). See also State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221, 1227 
(Utah 1998) (refusing to find "obvious" error where the undefined term in instruction, 
"forcible sexual act," ordinarily connoted required "lack of consent"); State v. Eagle Book, 
Inc., 583 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 1978) (trial court reasonably recognized that in distribution of 
pornographic material prosecution it was unnecessary to define the word, "exhibit" for the 
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jury because the "word [was] well understood with explicit common meaning"); State v. Day, 
572 P.2d 703, 705 (Utah 1977) ("Ordinarily, non-technical words of ordinary meaning 
should not be elaborated upon in the instructions given by the court [since] [i]t is presumed 
that jurors have ordinary intelligence and understand the meaning of ordinary words like 
'depraved' and 'indifference.'"). 
Unlike the term "attempt," at issue in Harmon, the operative terms of section 76-2-
202, "solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids," are terms of common 
understanding, which are not statutorily defined. "Attempt," on the other hand, as the 
Harmon court recognized, while a common term, has a specialized meaning within the 
criminal code. Defendant cites no authority in support of his claim that the operative terms 
of the party liability statute should be further defined for instructional purposes. Indeed, 
other courts have rejected challenges like defendant's in considering the adequacy of the 
same expressions of party liability used in the Utah statute. See State v. Gonzales, 817 P.2d 
1186, 1194 (N.M. 1991) (in instructing jury on aiding and abetting, trial court was not 
required to define instructional terms "help," "cause," and "encourage," as those terms were 
words with common meanings); State v. Newbold, 731 S.W.2d 373,384 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) 
(accomplice liability element not erroneously submitted to jury in terms of "aids or 
encourages," which were words of ordinary usage and easy understanding), overruled on 
other grounds, State v. Beeler, 12 S.W.3d 294, 298 (Mo. 2000). Cf. Thornton v. State, 570 
So. 2d 762, 772 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (further definition of "solicit" or "request" or other 
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words used in explanation of offense of solicitation to commit controlled substance crime 
since words were not defined in code and could be given their common meaning). In sum, 
defendant has failed to show that any error in the instructions was obvious or that, singly or 
as a whole, the instructions failed to inform the jury that it was required to find that defendant 
committed the elements of the charged offenses as an accomplice beyond a reasonable 
doubt.9 
D. Defendant fails to show prejudice. 
For the same reasons defendant fails to establish error, let alone obvious error, he fails 
to establish prejudice. Defendant's claim of prejudice is based on the erroneous assumption 
that he has demonstrated an instructional error and is therefore entitled to reversal as a matter 
of law under Laine and Harmon and their progeny. Aplt. Br. at 15-21. However, for the 
reasons stated in subpoints (B) and (C) above, defendant fails to demonstrate that the jury 
instructions as whole in this case were inadequate. He therefore fails to demonstrate that he 
is entitled to reversal as a matter of law under Laine and Harmon. 
9
 At Point II of his brief, defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance 
of counsel because his counsel failed to alert the trial court of the alleged deficiency in 
the elements instructions. Because no error occurred in the giving of the instructions, 
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance also fails. See State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 
TJ20, 984 P.2d 376 ("To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] 'must 
show that his counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and that counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced him.'") (citations and internal quotations omitted); State v. Simmons, 2000 
Utah App. Ct. 190, f 7, 5 P.3d 1228 (""The failure of counsel to make motions or 
objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance/"") 
(citations omitted). 
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In any event, even assuming there were some error in the instructions here, any error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S. 
Ct. 1827, 1837 (1999) (holding that "the omission of an element is an error that is subject to 
harmless-error analysis"). The test for determining whether the error is harmless "is whether 
it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained.'" Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,24(1967)). Even an error 
in the unanimity instruction may be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where "the jury 
necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt" every required element of the crime. Tillman 
v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 228 (Utah App. 1993) (Stewart, J. dissenting). See also State v. 
Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994) (failure to instruct on element was 
harmless where the trial testimony clearly and indisputably established that element). 
Defendant argues that this Court is not bound by Neder and may choose not to engage 
in a harmless error analysis as a matter of state law. Aplt. Br. at 23-26. In support, defendant 
cites Harmon and Jones. Aplt. Br. at 25-26. However, in both those cases, the supreme 
court refused to apply a harmless error analysis because an element "was totally omitted." 
Harmon, 712 P.2d at 292; Jones, 823 P.2d at 1061. See Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1292 
(applying harmless error and distinguishing Jones where "the trial court... failed to give the 
entire elements instruction"). That is not the case here. 
Defendant also relies on State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993), and 
Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10). Aplt. Br. at 25-26. However, should the Court deem it 
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necessary to reach this question, defendant fails to articulate any reason for departing from 
the federal harmless-error analysis in this case. Cf. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 
(Utah 1988) (reasoning that state constitution may be interpreted differently from federal 
constitution in order to protect Utahn's "from the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations 
given to the fourth amendment by the federal courts"). Nor has defendant shown that absent 
Neder's teaching, harmless-error review would be inappropriate as a matter of state law. As 
set forth above, Laine does not require reversal where, as here, the essential elements are 
given in separate instructions. Id. at 35. Moreover, any claim of instructional error with 
regard to defendant's participation as Ms. Tousley's accomplice is harmless because her 
conduct as a principal actor in cashing a false check and retaining part of the proceeds with 
the belief that "something was wrong, was uncontroverted at trial. See, e.g., Tillman, 855 
P.2d at 228; Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1292. See also State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35 ffif 27-31, 392 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (error in failing to instruct jury regarding penalty enhancement offense, 
that they must find all three defendants acted "in concert with two or more persons," to be 
"without legal consequence," as all three defendants were tried simultaneously before the 
same jury and found guilty of the underlying offense). Thus, any error in the instructions 
given in this case is amenable to harmless error analysis. 
Alternatively, defendant claims that even if the Neder standard applies, in order to find 
an instructional error harmless under Neder, the missing aiding and abetting element must 
be "supported by uncontroverted evidence . . . , evidence that could not rationally lead to a 
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contrary finding with respect to the omittoidement." Aplt. Br. at 26-27 (quoting Neder, * i > 
S. Ct. at 1838-39).. Defendant interprets this standard onh : be an assessment of 'he 
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In State v. Murphy, 2 7 Utah 2d 98, 100, 493 P.2d 617, 619 (1972), the defendant, 
convicted of first degree murder, claimed the trial court had erred in giving an elements 
instruction on se cond-degree 
alternative. Id at 619. The defendant assei ted that as a resu'u vi uie omission the jurv had 
no reasonable ,. -r.ative but to convict him, of first degree murder. It /. The supreme court 
doubted the possibility of error considei ing the language of the fii st degree murder 
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immediately after instruction was given, told jury that "the included offense of second-degree 
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As in Murphy, the prosecutor's and defense counsel's remarks rendered any error in 
the instructions harmless. After hearing all the evidence, which plainly implicated Ms. 
Tousley in defendant's criminal activity, the prosecutor specifically directed the jury's 
attention to the party liability instruction: "Now the other thing that I wanted to state to you 
is instruction No. 19. No. 19 is a very, very important instruction. It's probably the most 
important instruction - - to be [sic] in this particular case" (R. 150:125). The prosecutor then 
read the party liability instruction to the jury (R. 150:125). The prosecutor then immediately 
vaginal penetration was required, did not impermissibly allow jury to believe that anal 
penetration was sufficient, given that rape and sodomy were distinct crimes and 
instruction for rape was immediately followed by definition of sodomy specifying that 
anal penetration was required, that court explained, in responding to jury question, that 
penetration of male sex organ into female sex organ constituted act of sexual intercourse, 
and that instructions were placed in context by parties' closing arguments); People v. 
Malone, 762 P.2d 1249, 1280 (Cal. 1989) (erroneous instruction, which might have 
confused capital murder jury into thinking it was required to find defendant guilty as 
prerequisite to viewing accomplice testimony with distrust, was harmless where entirety 
of instructions and argument of both defense counsel and prosecutor directed jury to 
whether accomplice's testimony was corroborated would not have misled reasonable 
jurors); State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808, 818 (Minn. 1995) (trial court's jury 
instructions in prosecution for premeditated first-degree murder, when viewed as a whole, 
were more than adequate to inform jury of state's burden to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant did not act in heat of passion, even though trial court did not use 
pattern instruction which enumerates absence of heat of passion as element of 
premeditated first-degree murder; among other circumstances, state explicitly argued 
during closing argument that defendant did not act in heat of passion, and defense argued 
that defendant was guilty of only first-degree manslaughter because state failed to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt defendant's guilt of any greater crime charged); State v. Spencer, 
216 N.W.2d 131, 136 (Minn. 1974) (giving erroneous instruction in prosecution for 
aggravated assault that intent was not necessary element of the offense was not 
prejudicial error where prosecutor conceded that intent was a necessary element in his 
closing argument). 
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directed flic jur\ to the instructions on fouzery and theft by deception that "the defendant's 
a party to the offense" (R. 150:125). Later, the prosecutor essentially acknowledged that Ms. 
Tousley had been a participant in the offenses, while trying to put her i;i.. >* L-; an ; 
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"oppose[d] or contest[ed] by action or argument " Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary 497 (1993). Ms. Tousley testified that defendant gave her a $./-JHM: ,
 LCK 
See State \ Labru
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. iiig any theory b\ 
into victims or their car by means other than 
'in >.,gh use of firearm); Em *• <.-/ > *.*;.* * ; S.W 2d 850, 851-52 (Tex Crim Ap; 
20OO) (any error in instructs n on offense >r dt iving while intoxicated, which inaccurately 
stated that prohibited intoxicants included those other than alcohol, was harmless where 
no evidence of the defendant's intoxication other than be alcohol was introduced and 
prosecutor asked jury to find that the defendant was intoxicated due to v 'ine and other 
alcohol only). 
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endorsed with Ms. Westlake's signature, asked her to cash it, and thereafter took $2,500 (R. 
150:64-72). This testimony was unopposed and uncontested. As discussed more fully in 
Point II of this brief, any inconsistencies in Ms. Tousley's testimony go to peripheral issues 
and are otherwise reflective of her obvious attempts to limit her own culpability, a fact that 
would have been obvious to the jury and which it must have considered in rendering its 
verdict. In sum, even if the instructions omitted party liability as a necessary element of the 
offenses, defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the omission. 
POINT II 
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY 
VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT 
INTENTIONALLY AIDED MS. TOUSLEY IN COMMITTING 
FORGERY AND THEFT BY DECEPTION 
Defendant claims that because Ms. Tousley's testimony was unreliable, the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain his convictions. The claim is unsupported by the record.12 
In order to succeed on his claim, defendant must marshal the evidence, including 
circumstantial evidence, supporting the verdict, then demonstrate that the marshaled evidence 
fails to establish that he, as a party acting with Ms. Tousley, committed forgery and theft by 
deception. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470,472 (Utah App. 1991). See also Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991) (holding that 'one challenging the verdict must 
12
 Defendant preserved his claim by moving to dismiss the charges for insufficient 
evidence at the close of all the evidence, which the court denied (R. 150:119). See State 
v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 17, 10 P.3d 346 (holding that a claim of insufficient evidence 
must be preserved at trial). 
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marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict"). The appellate court 
"review[s] the evidence and all inferences which may reasonatuv oe s.dwu :i- ;-
1 - - . • > 
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbably that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt[.]" v -\h\ "70 P.2d at 124. See aho State \ Ien;~*r, 
( > T r . n i • :- •• of-f-t--* - s - ~i* M-turhirj the y " "s 
verdict." State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). Moreover, it is within the exclusive 
province of the jury to judge the credibility of the witnesses and the wci^m of the L * *ucnce. 
A . >:ait \. Jutu. ,
 L 
• 1 'o con. "' • i ::t defendant :: f forgery the State necuea tu prove that defendant intentionally 
or knowingly "made, executed, _ red a writing" which falsely purported to be the 
unauthorized act of Ms. Westlake with apurpose to defraud anyone. See Jury Instruction #20 
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deception the State needed to prove that defendar:. -liL j or knowingly obtained or 
exercised control over property of America First by deception and with the purpose of 
depriving America First < . . pi op-.:; -. L - i 
Code ^ iiri § 76 6 405 (1999) I c slio'1 * defendant was guilty as a party to the offenses the 
State needed to show either that defer: i irectly committed the offenses or "solicited], 
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requested], command[ed], encourage[d], or intentionally aid[ed] Ms. Tousley's in her 
commission of the offense. See Jury Instruction #19, R. 103; Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(1999). 
The evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from it the amply support defendant's 
convictions for both offenses. The undisputed evidence was that on April 28, 1998, 
defendant asked Ms. Tousley to run a check, drawn on Providian National Bank through her 
checking account at America First Credit Union (R. 150:64-67,69; State's Ex. 1). The check 
was made out for $3,000 to "Patricia Westlake," at "149 South Seventh East" in Salt Lake 
City, and it was already endorsed with Ms. Westlake's name when defendant gave it to Ms. 
Tousley (R. 150:69-71). Defendant told Ms. Tousley that Ms. Westlake owed him money 
(R. 150:68-70,107). However, Ms. Westlake did not know defendant, did not owe him any 
money, had not signed any checks over to defendant, and had not given him permission to 
sign her name to any checks (R. 150; 110-12). 
Defendant offered Ms. Tousley $500 in exchange for her running the check through 
her account and delivering $2,500 to him (R. 150:70). Although she suspected there was 
something wrong about the transaction, she endorsed the check, deposited it in her America 
First account, and delivered $2,500 from that account to defendant the following day (R. 
150:70-72, 79). On the same day, April 29, defendant gave Ms. Tousley another $3,000, 
dated April 27,1998, made out exactly like the first check, and instructed her to do the same 
thing with it as she had with the first check (R. 150:72-73; State's Ex. 2). Defendant again 
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saidtl ia:tl\ Is W c: stlake owed him monej (R 150:73 74) Followr^deh5" lam ain^i:- -
Ms. Tousley endorsed the back of the check with her name and deposited it mt \er a :\ir.i 
America First branch (R. 77~~'4^ This check was recognized as suspicious by America First 
agents and was not cashed (ts i 
1 oi isle)/ *"s accoi int. c onfii rr»*H the transactions Ms. Tousley had previously testified to (R. 
150:98-102; State's Exhibit ni). 
On April 28, 1998. defendant ua . • •* :,ig at 149 South } 00 East in Salt Lake Cit> , 
M , I'M I.I \\r l l . tke - to rmr- i .u l i l r i - . 11-1 I h i H i M f\\ |n"?| | | WV-.ill i l l l n i h ' 1 i » s r i l h ( ;r 
account at Providian prior to April 28, 1998 (150:108-09). However, Providian had 
continued to send Ms. Westlake $3,000 checks to her 149 South 700 East address even after 
she hao mo v. . Wause mail was ciemeua tnro«*j. ~ .. : me 
a p a i t i n °~~ • H - i -. M ' i*. i<* t 
residence (R. {JU;107-08J. 
The foregoing evidence amply supports the jury's verdict of guilt on both offenses. 
rartiLUiam, tin v\ luciice showed that defendant, througn rn. --jcih, i i 
* •
 %
 • : • N * \i k e *^  mail was delivered, had exclusive access to forged checks and directed 
Ms. Tousley to utter the checks and return the proceeds to him. See State v. Kihlstrom, 1999 
Utah App, Ct. 289,1| 1 J, ^^ l1 '*^y^ ^ l ' 1 I| I1'"' ll^l "a person who merely utters a forged 
iiii'iiliiiiiiiii'iill I iiiiiii in m l r i i n l I I M 1 i I in in 11 lllkiii \ l i ' i i p " i i ilimi \\n\n \ \ 'in | m i n i i j i Suae i II illi 'm1 . , 
712 P.2d 220,223 (Utah 1985)), cert u^n^u, 4 P.3 J. 1289 (Utah 2000). Defendant argues, 
29 
however, that Ms. Tousley's testimony was so "false," "perjurious," and "incredible," that 
the jury must have "entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime[s]." Aplt. Br. at 31-37. 
"In reviewing an insufficiency of evidence claim . . . we may not weigh evidence or 
assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury believed the evidence and 
inferences that support the verdict.'" Chaney, 1999 Utah Ct. App. at f30 (quoting State v. 
Wood, 868 P.2d 70, 87 (Utah 1993)). In light of governing authority, defendant's reliance 
on inconsistencies in Ms. Tousley's testimony is unavailing. See State v. Marcum, 750 P.2d 
599, 601 (Utah 1988) ("[Inconsistencies go merely to the weight of the evidence and the 
credibility of the witnesses."). 
Defendant identifies a number of inconsistencies in Ms. Tousley's trial testimony as 
compared with her initial interview with police and at the preliminary hearing. In brief, those 
inconsistencies are as follows: (1) an initial denial that both she and defendant worked at a 
Taco Bell, (2) an initial statement that, instead of proceeding only with defendant to America 
First, she was accompanied by defendant an another person, (3) initially denying to police 
that defendant had driven her to the bank, (4) denying at trial, in opposition to her testimony 
at the preliminary hearing, that she had written "payed [sic] to the order of," (5) assertion at 
trial that she only printed her name, whereas casual inspection of the first check shows that 
the same person "appears" to have written "payed [sic] to the order of," and "Cathi Tousley," 
(6) initially claiming to have withdrawn the entire $3,000 in two separate transactions, when 
30 
she w ithdrew only $2,500, and (/ * • • •.. niou u\ai *hc deposited the second check on April 29, 
v l i i i i. "in h a n k r c c o n l s shm s illm nil l i l i i1 * l< • 11 , .ml ii". iiii 1^  l a Il : | > 11 H i at 1!> ,!- ' 1 
The foregoing inconsistencies are alternatively trivial or reflective of Ms. Tousley's 
obvious attempts to minimize her culpability, a preeminent fact at trial. Both the prosecutor 
and defense counsel made clear beyond mistake that Ms. I ousley was an accomplice at some 
li ("Ill mi iliifiiil.iiiiiil'" iiiiiitiitysioii II I II in I II in. mi in i 'c I. II! n f f r n s e 1 il he flii i v . i r " i i t i t l n l I n s v n i ' l i Ihinr 
testimony and determine the facts in light of her evident involvement. Such inconsistencies 
as defendant relies on are insufficient to iiMify reversal. 
Rased mi llic tinepiiiiiL!, dis « ** ^oectfully -• that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
r e q u *'•*** * ** ~ " * -* - - — , ^ * ~;;wn->~ \ o r i n o n ISSUc j ^ l s r equest is 
bolstered by defendant's unifoi irri failure to fill / basic requirements of marshaling 
the evidence and presenting an adequate record for appeal, 
&t 
RFSPFfTFUM.Y SI iRMITTlfilllns, J_ I. /; • Ii: f : • « -. 20C 1! ' 
MARKL. SHUR TLEFF 
Attorney Genei all
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ADDENDA 
\DI)f NIH hi 
UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
76-2-202. Criminal responsibility for direct commission 
of offense or for conduct of another. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of an 
offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands, 
encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which 
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
76-6-405. Theft by deception. 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of 
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as 
to matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely 
to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing* means an 
exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to 
the public or to a class or .group. 
76-6-501, u. :-.. -. 
(1) A person is guilty of forgeij i anyone, vr with 
knowledge that he is facilitating a anyone, he 
(a) alters any writing of anutiici wiuiout his *er- i y 
such altered writing; or 
(b) makes, completes, issues > pi." 
lishes, or utters any writing so that tne writing ur the r* 
execution, authentication, issuance, transference, pub 
purports to be the act of another, whether the pe 
nonexistent, or purports to have been executed at a ti
 x 
numbered sequence other than was in fact the case, or to be a copy of an 
original when no such original existed. 
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or 
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including 
forms such as: 
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, 
money, and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification; 
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued 
by a government or any agency; or 
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing 
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary 
interest in or claim against any person or enterprise. 
(3) Forgery is a felony of the third degree. 
ITAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Rule . Instructions. 
idl At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct 
the jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy 
of its proposed instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such instructions 
may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall distinguish, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating 
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instruc 
tions in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, jiid il the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact. 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court 
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ADDENDUM C 
rlLE0D^l!C7C2URT 
Third Judical District 
By. 
NOV 15 ;::3 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
Defendant . 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CRIMINAL NO. 991902669 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of FORGERY and THEFT BY DECEPTION . The Information 
alleges: 
FORGERY, a Third Degree Felony, at 3190 South Richmond Street, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about April 28, 1998, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 501, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, as amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, a 
party to the offense, did alter, make, complete, execute, 
authenticate, issue, transfer, publish, or utter any writing so 
that the writing or the making, completion, execution, 
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance 
purported to be the act of another, with a purpose to defraud. 
THEFT BY DECEPTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 3190 South 
Richmond Street, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
April 28, 1998, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 405, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, BRIAN 
WILLIAM DRAKE, a party to the offense, obtained or exercised 
control over the property of America First Credit Union by 
deception, with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and that 
the value of said property is or exceeds $1,000, but is less than 
$5,000-
INSTRUCTION NO. g 
Instruction No. 1 is not to be considered by you as a 
statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be 
regarded by you merely as a summarized statement of the 
allegations of the Information. The mere fact that the 
defendant stands charged with an offense is not to be taken by 
you as any evidence of his guilt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
You are instructed that to the Information the defendant 
has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty 
denies each of the essential allegations of the charges 
contained in the Information and casts upon the State the 
burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant 
has been charged with an offense and has been held to answer to 
the charges by a committing magistrate is not any evidence of 
his guilt and is not even a circumstance which should be 
considered by you in determining his guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has 
been stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, 
and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not 
to single out any certain sentence or any individual point or 
instruction and ignore the others. You are to consider all the 
instructions as a whole and to regard each in the light of all 
the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no 
significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who 
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense 
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
INSTRUCTION NO. *"~ 
Before you can convict the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
of the offense of Forgery as charged in count I of the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 28th day of April, 1998, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
intentionally or knowingly made, executed, issued or uttered a 
writing; and 
2. That said writing or utterance purported to be the act 
of Patricia R. Westlake; and 
3. That said writing or utterance was not the act of 
Patricia R. Westlake; and 
4. That said writing or utterance was not authorized by 
Patricia R. Westlake; and 
5. That the said defendant then and there knew the 
writing was not the act of Patricia R. Westlake and was not 
authorized by Patricia R. Westlake; and 
6. That the said defendant then and there had a purpose 
to defraud. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Forgery as charged in count I 
of the information. If, on the other hand, you are not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
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foregoing elements, then you must 
of count I. 
find the defendant not guilty 
|o\. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ -
Before you can convict the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
of the offense of Theft by Deception as charged in count II of 
the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 28th day of April, 1998, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, BRIAN WILLIAM DRAKE, 
intentionally or knowingly obtained or exercised control over 
the property of America First Credit Union; and 
2. That the defendant obtained or exercised control over 
such property by deception; and 
3. That the defendant obtained or exercised control over 
such property with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof; and 
4. That the value of the property was or exceeded 
$1,000.00 but was less than $5,000.00. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Theft by Deception as charged 
in count II of the information. If, on the other hand, you are 
not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of 
the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not 
guilty of count II. 
